In the 1970s, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked, “Who do I call when I want to call Europe?” That question appears relevant again decades later, as the European Union struggles to give a coherent response to rising Middle Eastern tensions.
The developing conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran is at the core of the current geopolitical strain. This unstable triangle has once again revealed the “capability–expectations gap” in Europe’s foreign policy framework.
Member states continue to act in disparate ways despite the European Union’s objective of functioning as a unified geopolitical force. Some governments are more receptive to strategic alignment with Washington, while others encourage diplomacy.
Washington’s Pressure Campaign
Donald Trump has stepped up his calls for Europe to take on a more influential role in world affairs. The U.S. government has called on its allies in Europe to take decisive military action. Against this backdrop, the Strait of Hormuz appeared as a critical test case and Washington demanded the deployment of European naval forces to protect maritime traffic. In an interview that came out on March 16, statements from Donald Trump carry a warning tone: how they respond to Washington’s calls for support could significantly impact the future of the NATO alliance. He said: “If there is no response or if it is a negative response, it will be very bad for NATO’s future.”
A Fragmented European Voice
Also on March 16, at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, Kaja Kallas gave a speech where she expressed that there may be a shift in the European Union’s geopolitical posture. Most strikingly, she framed the ongoing conflict in language that underscored distance describing it as “not Europe’s war.” Then, both Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, and Antonio Costa, the President of European Council, raised major concerns on the situation and urged for diplomatic solutions and the respect of international law for a de-escalation. They have also condemned Iran unacceptable attacks and outlined the economic negative impacts that this war will probably bring about in Europe.
Countries including Germany, Spain and, to some extent, Italy have already refused to participate in any immediate military mission in the Gulf.
Germany distances itself from the USA: a change of tack on war in Iran
The German government has, in fact, changed its approach towards the USA. Until the beginning of the war in Iran, Friedrich Merz and his collaborators had been often criticised for having been too lenient and understanding with President Donald Trump’s decisions and statements. For example, during a meeting held in the Oval Office on March 3, while Dondald Trump was attacking Spain for its refusal to militarily collaborate in the war in Iran, the German chancellor remained silent rather than defending its EU ally. However, in the last weeks, something changed. On March 16, the government spokesperson Stefan Kornelius declared that “the government will not get involved” and added that “this war has nothing to do with NATO”, rejecting the US proposal for a military involvement in the Strait of Hormuz. The same stance was reaffirmed by the Defense Minister Boris Pistorius who expressed the need for diplomatic solutions, rather than “additional warships that will not contribute to the end of the war”. He then continued by saying that “Germany’s position has always been that we agree in principle with a change in the political situation in Iran in order to facilitate a peaceful solution for the region,” but he raised questions about the US and Israel strategy to achieve this goal, just like Friedrich Merz had previously stated on March 10 too.
Italy tries to stay balanced between Brussels and Washington
As far as Italy is concerned, the government’s stance is still vague and unclear. On March 5, Antonio Tajani, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Guido Crosetto, the Minister of Defense, gave a speech at the Italian Parliament, where they both declared that “Italy is not and will not be at war” and alleged that the USA and Israel attacks in Iran are contrary to international law.
However, they confirmed that Italy will provide military help to the Gulf countries, in particular to Cyprus, “not only because they are our allies, but especially because of the thousands of Italian citizens and soldiers who live there and that we have the duty to protect”, Antonio Tajani stated.
During the same parliamentary session, a resolution was approved, “committing the government to participate with national assets in the joint effort within the European Union to support EU member states in defending their territory from Iranian missile or drone attacks”. A week later, on the 11 of March, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni confirmed at the Parliament what her colleagues previously said but she avoided to expose too much on the issue. On the one hand, she condemned the bombing on the Iranian elementary school in Mineb that caused around 175 victims – most of them children – and urged for clarifications on the responsibility of this incident . On the other hand, she stated that the American and Israeli attacks on Iran took place in a weak moment for international law, but without firmly criticising their actions. On the contrary, she later said that this war didn’t begin on February 28, but on the 7 of October 2023, since Iran supported Hamas attack in Israel.
This approach is coherent with the latest decisions made by the Italian government and in particular by Meloni, who is trying to stand out as a figure who can stand in the gap between the European Union and the United States, in a period where their relationship has never been so strained. Therefore, she wants to follow the European Union interests, but at the same she is cautious in displeasing Donald Trump, trying not to lose her privilege.
Spain’s Strategic Distance: A Long History Behind Its Opposition to U.S. Policy
Spain had already demonstrated a firm position from the outset, emerging as one of Europe’s leading voices against escalation in the conflict with Iran. On March 16, Spain’s Defence Minister, Margarita Robles, called on the United Nations to guarantee the safety of peacekeepers in Lebanon.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez revived the historical context for the reason of his opposition to the US, warning of the long-term consequences of US-led interventions. Reflecting on Iraq, he argued that what was presented as a mission to bring democracy and security instead triggered “a drastic increase in jihadist terrorism, a serious migration crisis and rising energy and living costs.”
Spain’s coolness toward the United States has a long history. The first wound was in 1898, when Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in war with the United States, a defeat still remembered in Spanish history as a national trauma.
Later came Washington’s embrace of dictator Francisco Franco after the Spanish Civil War, especially through the 1953 Pact of Madrid, which gave the US military bases in Spain and granted Franco international legitimacy without requiring democratic reform. For many Spaniards, especially on the left, the United States was not the power that helped liberate Spain from dictatorship, but one that helped stabilize it.
Then came Iraq. Spain was one of the countries most opposed to the Iraq war. Around 90% of Spaniards rejected it in 2003, yet Prime Minister José María Aznar backed Washington and London anyway. That decision put his government at odds with public opinion. After the 2004 Madrid train bombings, Spaniards voted in huge numbers and elected José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who quickly withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. Iraq became a symbol in the Spanish imagination, that alignment with Washington could bring domestic political costs.
Echoes of that moment can still be seen more than 20 years later, as Spain once again distances itself from U.S. strategic priorities and advocates for international cooperation. Under demands from Donald Trump, NATO members decided in June 2025 to raise defense spending from 2% to 5% of GDP by 2035 as a result of growing international tensions, especially those related to the conflict in Ukraine and to modernize NATO forces. Spain, despite its open opposition to this objective and its differing perspective on security requirements signed the agreement after securing a cap of 2.1% and a review in 2029 at the conclusion of the Trump administration.
Also, in late February, Spain refused the United States permission to use military bases on its territory to launch attacks on Iran.
More recently, as EU leaders met on 19 March, Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchezstated: “The war in Iran is illegal, and Spain has condemned it from the outset. The values that have brought peace, prosperity, and stability to Europe for decades are precisely the ones that must be defended when they are needed the most.”
Sánchez has repeatedly reaffirmed his position “no a la guerra” – “no to war” which has become a symbolic slogan in Spanish and also in Turkish media. Even during the Oscars, the Spanish actor Javier Bardem used his suit to express opposition to the war in Gaza, bringing the issue into the awards ceremony.
France Between Nuclear Deterrence and Iran Concerns
On the other side France gave signals that it could support efforts to restore maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Speaking on March 18, the French economy minister Roland Lescure said reopening the strategic waterway would be “the only durable way” to stabilize global energy markets.
Also France’s ambassador to the UN had expressed France’s official position during the United Nations Security Council meeting held in New York on March 12, 2026.
From the French perspective, concerns stem primarily from Iran’s nuclear activities and the country’s continued uranium enrichment. The accumulation of highly enriched uranium represents a serious proliferation risk. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also shown concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, noting that it has not had access to parts of Iran’s nuclear material and facilities for over eight months. The Agency stated that it cannot currently provide assurances that nuclear material has not been diverted from peaceful uses particularly after Tehran officially suspended cooperation with the IAEA on July 2, 2025.
However, France’s alignment with the United States’ position, strongly advocating for the limitation of Iran’s nuclear activities, raises incoherent questions with the traditional foundations of its deterrence doctrine.
In fact, Emmanuel Macron proposed in his 2 March 2026 speech to extend a French “nuclear umbrella” to European allies. That is an important step to Europeanization of its national deterrence. French nuclear strategy has historically been built on strict national sovereignty and independence. Since Charles de Gaulle, nuclear weapons have been central to France’s strategic autonomy, particularly in distancing itself from NATO’s integrated structures. France developed a complete nuclear triad and achieved full operational capability by the 1970s, ensuring a credible second-strike capability through its submarine-based forces. Nuclear arms are seen as solely political tools, intended to ensure national survival and freedom of action.
Macron’s introduction of the concept of “forward deterrence” seeks to extend France’s nuclear capability beyond its borders and to incorporate its European partners into its deterrence strategy, thus making French nuclear deterrence “European in depth” . Of course, all of this takes place within clearly defined red lines: there will be no sharing of the nuclear decision-making authority, which remains exclusively in the hands of the President, and no NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangements.
Why can’t the EU take a one single stand?
The war in Iran has brought out a long-standing problem for the European Union, which is the difficulty to act in a cohesive way towards global challenges. This is not an ideological issue, but structural. It concerns the way the European Union was built and organized.
First of all, foreign and security policy is a contested area between the European Union and the single member states.
According to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) signed in 2007, the European nations have a lot of control on many issues. For example, according to article 24 and 31, foreign and security policy are subjected to specific rules and procedures, such as the unanimity rule which consists in the fundamental condition of all the Member States to agree on a same solution in order to move forward and take a definite decision on topics like international sanctions, military and civil missions and common diplomatic positions. This principle gives a pivotal power to each European State, although it has often represented an obstacle rather than a symbol of unity, as it has been used to reject important actions and slow down the decision-making process. For instance, this is what the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has fostered on several occasions, blocking sanctions against Russia and loans to Ukraine.
The European Union foresees a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which, however, can’t replace the national one. In fact, the Treaties respect the sovereignty of each State, establishing that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States” (article 4 – TEU). In such a scenario, we may state that foreign and security policy is an intergovernative area characterised by a prominence given to single States rather than the European Union as a whole. The States have the control of the Union, not the opposite.
Secondly, many figures are charged to represent the EU or decide its guidelines in foreign affairs. More precisely, four of them count the most: the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Each of them plays a small but central role in European foreign politics.
This is a very fragmented and confusing organization of power, where the same policy area is split in different parts and phases and shared between different political bodies, rather than a single one, which could lead to a more cohesive and clear foreign policy.
The EU must choose
The reason behind this lack of unity within the European Union is, once again, linked to the political structure it is embedded in. Nowadays, the EU is more like a Confederation, where the states can keep their absolute sovereignty in many fields, while the central government has limited powers, rather than a Federation, characterised by a common politics and a strong central power who directly rule on the nations that are part of it. At this point, this seems to be one of the major factors that is hindering the European Union to become more influential on the global stage. Therefore, the EU’ future will depend on the choice between fragmentation or unity, which means between weakness or powerfulness.