The latest Poland–Germany Barometer shows a sharp drop in Polish affection for Germans — from over 50% in 2018 to just 32% today — while German attitudes toward Poles remain at historically high levels. Agnieszka Łada-Konefał, Deputy Director of the German Institute for Polish Affairs in Darmstadt, highlights the role of social media, political polarization, and the difference between general perceptions of “Germans as a group” and acceptance of individual Germans.

Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: What are the main takeaways from this year’s Poland–Germany Barometer?

Agnieszka Łada-Konefał, German Institute for Polish Affairs, Darmstadt: The Barometer, a representative survey of how Poles and Germans perceive each other, now in its 25th year, brings several new and sometimes surprising findings. The biggest change is a sharp decline in Polish sympathy for Germans. Only one-third of Poles now express positive feelings toward Germans, while one-quarter report negative feelings.

On the German side, the trend is different: Germans increasingly like Poles, and negative feelings are at their lowest level since our first surveys. This pattern is visible across other questions too, such as acceptance of a member of the other nationality in specific social roles — like neighbor, teacher, or coworker — which has decreased among Poles but risen among Germans.

So, we are seeing historically low levels of Polish sympathy toward Germans. How does this compare over a longer timeline?

We started asking Barometer questions in 2000, so we can see the dynamics over time. The decline in Polish sympathy is mostly a recent phenomenon. For years, complaints focused on Germans not liking Poles, being indifferent, or uninterested. Now the pendulum has swung: Germans hold historically positive views toward Poles, with high acceptance of them as neighbors, colleagues, or family members. Meanwhile, Polish acceptance levels had grown to about 80% in past years, but recently dropped by several percentage points.

Looking at the Barometer charts, the contrast between general perception and acceptance in specific roles stands out. Could you explain that?

Yes, this has been a consistent pattern. General sympathy relates to broad categories like “Germans” or “Poles” and is strongly influenced by media and political discourse. Acceptance, on the other hand, applies to a specific person in a concrete relationship, making it easier to approve of them. This is why acceptance rates are always higher than general sympathy.

So, Poles prefer individual Germans over the idea of Germans as a whole. Historically, when did Poles feel most positive toward Germans?

In 2018, around 56% of Poles expressed positive feelings, which was higher than today but still moderate. Today, Poles most like Czechs — 55% express sympathy — while German sympathy has fallen to 32%. Similar low levels of sympathy were last seen in 2008, after which things improved until this year.

Do you explore why Poles feel this way about Germans?

We don’t ask open-ended questions about reasons, but we analyze respondent profiles — demographics, residence, education, political preferences, media sources, and experience abroad. We see that Germans from the East tend to like Poles more, often due to personal experience in Poland. Direct contact strongly correlates with positive feelings.

How does political affiliation affect attitudes toward Germans?

It is very clear: political preferences matter. Right-wing party voters are more likely to express negative feelings toward Germans, while voters of the current government coalition show more sympathy. This pattern has been stable for years.

How do Poles feel about other nationalities?

Poles consistently rate Czechs most positively — over 50% express sympathy. About half like British people, slightly fewer Americans. Germans rank below these, followed by Ukrainians, Turks, and Russians.

Have these attitudes changed over time?

Sympathy for Americans has declined to below 50%. Czechia remains positively viewed. Sympathy for Russians dropped sharply after 2022. Sympathy for Ukrainians is currently low at 22%, reflecting a recent decline in positive perceptions.

Where do Poles get information about Germans, and does this affect their views?

We ask about multiple sources; respondents can select more than one. Poles most often cite school, family, online portals, and politicians’ statements — each chosen by about a third. Germans mainly rely on television. Poles also use social media more than Germans. Cross-referencing shows that people who have lived in the other country tend to have more positive views, while heavy social media users in Poland tend to have more negative opinions of Germans and German politics.

Should this year’s Barometer leave us with any reflections that could change attitudes?

I would highlight two points. First, direct contacts — visits, exchanges, city cooperation, social, professional, and cultural activities — matter. Those who spend time in the other country form more stable, less manipulable opinions. Second, governments must take concrete initiatives and cooperate genuinely. Currently, this is lacking. Positive political signals, for example on historical issues, security, or future cooperation, are missing. Without these, public trust and positive perception remain weak.

The 2025 Poland–Germany Barometer was prepared by Dr. Jacek Kucharczyk, President of the Institute of Public Affairs, and Dr. Agnieszka Łada-Konefał, Deputy Director of the German Institute for Polish Affairs in Darmstadt. It is a joint project of the Institute of Public Affairs, the German Institute for Polish Affairs, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland, and the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation. The full Barometer is available HERE.

Shape the conversation

Do you have anything to add to this story? Any ideas for interviews or angles we should explore? Let us know if you’d like to write a follow-up, a counterpoint, or share a similar story.