With a reported death toll of over 30,000, the protests in Iran may be the deadliest revolution since World War II. At the same time, Iranians have lost access to the internet and the ability to communicate with loved ones abroad due to a total communications blackout. Iran has effectively disconnected itself from the rest of the world, and the outside world has no clear picture of what is happening inside the country apart from videos from the protests and the graphic images of dead bodies that are circulated on social media.

The Timeline of the Protests

The protests began on 28 December 2025 amid a collapsing economy and quickly escalated into an open revolt against the Islamic Republic. Sparked by bazaar merchants in Tehran facing a currency crash and hyperinflation, the unrest spread across all 31 provinces and drew in students, workers, women, Gen Z, and ethnic minorities.

Demonstrators moved from economic grievances to explicit calls for regime change, chanting strong anti-Khamenei and often pro-Pahlavi slogans, organising widespread strikes, and engaging in street battles in which some areas briefly slipped from state control.

The state responded with extreme force. The IRGC, police, and Basij used live ammunition, snipers, and heavy weapons; raided hospitals to arrest or kill the wounded; pressured families of the dead; broadcast forced confessions; and deployed foreign Shia militias to reinforce security forces. From 8 January 2026, authorities imposed a severe internet and phone blackout, jammed Starlink, and worked toward a permanent “kill switch” to isolate Iran online, while granting limited access to regime-aligned entities.

Casualty estimates under the blackout diverge sharply. Human rights monitors confirm thousands killed and tens of thousands arrested. At the same time, leaks from doctors and activists suggest 6,964–18,694 dead, 51,790 arrested, and 11,022 injured, potentially making this the deadliest repression in modern Iranian history. The judiciary brands protesters “enemies of God,” fast-tracks harsh trials, and carries out dozens of executions; there are also reports of chemical agents and mysterious injections used against demonstrators. Domestically, Khamenei blames foreign enemies and insists on crushing “rioters,” while President Pezeshkian’s limited economic concessions are widely seen as too little, too late.

Even though the Islamic regime has largely suppressed the protests since then, this does not mean that Iranians have stopped protesting against Khamenei. In fact, the protests have moved abroad: hundreds of thousands of diaspora Iranians protested against the regime across the world on 14 February. Around 200,000 people attended the demonstrations in Munich alone. The protesters carried images of the opposition leader Reza Pahlavi and chanted slogans such as ‘Death to Khamenei‘ and ‘Regime change in Iran’. Some protesters wore red hats bearing the slogan ‘Make Iran great again’, inspired by similar hats worn by Trump supporters. In London, some protesters carried photographs of family members or friends who were killed in protests in Iran, while others held up images of Donald Trump and his social media posts about Iran, urging him to finally take action.

These protests are not the first time Iranians have risen against the regime. Mass demonstrations have erupted repeatedly in the past, including in 2022 after the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the Guidance Patrol for allegedly not wearing her hijab properly, which sparked nationwide protests against the Islamic Republic and compulsory hijab laws. However, the current uprising may be the most crucial since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as Iran’s future is likely to be shaped by its outcome.

Europe's Reaction

It did not take long for the EU to react. On 3rd January, the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a statement expressing concern over the reported casualties and urging maximum restraint from Iranian security forces, while calling for inclusive dialogue to address socio-economic grievances. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, condemned the “excessive use of force” and the “continued restriction of freedom,” highlighting the “horrifying” rise in casualties and demanding the immediate release of detained protesters as well as the restoration of internet access. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, described the response as “disproportionate” and “heavy-handed,” emphasising the need to respect the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression.

European Parliament President Roberta Metsola led a moment of applause for the protesters during a plenary session, honouring those killed and calling for actions that go beyond words, including the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation. The European Parliament has also banned Iranian diplomats from accessing its buildings in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg as a measure intended to delegitimise the regime. In a joint G7 statement, foreign ministers condemned the “brutal repression” and expressed alarm at the high death toll, warning of additional restrictive measures if violations continue.

In addition to voicing support for the Iranian people, the EU has announced new sanctions against the Islamic Republic. It is preparing to expand its existing sanctions regime against Iran, which already includes travel bans, asset freezes, and restrictions related to human rights violations, nuclear activities, and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. New proposals, signalled by Kallas and von der Leyen, target individuals and entities responsible for the repression, such as security forces, judges, and those involved in internet shutdowns. These measures build on the regime extended through 2026 and could be presented imminently.

Several EU member states, including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, have summoned Iranian ambassadors to protest the violence and demand accountability. The European Green Party, along with figures such as former Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša, has pushed for listing the IRGC as a terrorist group—a long-standing demand that has not yet been fully adopted at the EU level.

On 20th January, von der Leyen announced that she had proposed an EU ban on exports of critical drone and missile technologies to Iran; the EU Council is proposing new sanctions against Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni and 14 other senior IRGC officials for their role in the crackdown.

On the other hand, Spanish MEP Irene Montero has spoken out against the sanctions on the Islamic Republic. On her social media, she wrote:

“Not a single sanction on Israel in three years of genocide, nor on the US for its crimes, but the European Union does sanction Iran ‘for human rights’. Europe has lost all its credibility and is paving the way to support another war for oil at Trump’s orders.”

Belgian MEP Marc Botenga argues sanctions primarily hurt civilians and Iran’s middle class, strengthening the IRGC and militarising Iran’s economy.

Sanctions weaken the forces of social change inside Iran, fostering inequality, corruption, and the militarisation of the Iranian economy,” he said.

On 22nd January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky criticised Europe’s inaction on Iran during his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

“Europe offers nothing and does not want to enter this issue in support of the Iranian people and the democracy they need.”

IRGC's Designation as a Terrorist Organisation

At first, Europe was divided when it came to designating the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, similar to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. There were reports that several European countries, including Spain, Italy, France, and Luxembourg, opposed this move. However, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, Xavier Bettel, later stated that the country was in favour of listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, while France, Italy, and Spain subsequently changed their stance and are now in favour.

According to EPP President Manfred Weber, Spain, Italy, and France were reportedly blocking the decision to keep “communication channels” open with the IRGC. Furthermore, some EU officials argued that many members of the IRGC had already been sanctioned due to Iran’s nuclear programme and that formally designating it as a terrorist organisation could risk further escalation in the country and the wider region.

On 13th January, UK Business Secretary Peter Kyle told Times Radio that the UK would not designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. He said the British government had reviewed the IRGC’s status and had been advised that prohibiting a foreign state body under terrorism laws was not appropriate, despite the IRGC’s involvement in the crackdown during the protests. The IRGC has already been labelled a terrorist organisation in several countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

In the end, on 29th January, the EU unanimously agreed to designate Iran’s IRGC as a terrorist organisation. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said this decision responded to Iran’s violent suppression of nationwide protests.

Repression cannot go unanswered. Any regime that kills thousands of its own people is working toward its own demise,” Kallas wrote on X.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi criticised the EU’s decision, saying that Europe is “making another major strategic mistake.” Araqchi added that “the EU’s current posture is deeply damaging to its own interests.”

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), founded in May 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, is a main branch of Iran’s armed forces. Its constitutional mission is to protect the Islamic Republic and the legacy of the Revolution, including preventing coups, foreign interference, and “deviant” internal movements. Closely tied to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it has become his primary power base; he has promoted IRGC commanders into key positions throughout the state.

The IRGC played a central role in the Iran–Iraq War and now controls Iran’s ballistic missile programme. It trains, arms, and coordinates allied groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shia militias. It has been active in conflicts in Lebanon (including the 2006 war), Syria (backing the Assad regime), Iraq (fighting ISIS and supporting militias), Yemen (backing the Houthis), and, more recently, in supporting Russia’s drone campaign in Ukraine. The IRGC led Iran’s large-scale drone and missile strike on Israel in April 2024 and suffered significant leadership losses in the 12-day Iran–Israel war in June 2025.

The IRGC also runs a vast business empire through Khatam al-Anbiya and other front companies, with stakes in construction, dams, and infrastructure; oil, gas, and petrochemicals; telecommunications (including a major stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran); automotive and shipbuilding (e.g., SADRA); banking; and bonyads (foundations).

The IRGC also commands auxiliary forces and proxies, including the Basij, a paramilitary force used for internal security, morality policing, provision of social services, and protest repression; and Liwa Fatemiyoun (Afghan) and Liwa Zainebiyoun (Pakistani), IRGC-organised Shia militias fighting mainly in Syria and on other regional fronts.

US Intervention & Reza Pahlavi: An Ideal Solution for Many Iranians, a Polarising Solution in Europe

“I assume that we are now witnessing the final days and weeks of this regime,” the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said during his visit to India on 13th January. The question is no longer whether the Islamic regime will be overthrown, but rather when, how, and by whom. While many Iranians, both in Iran and abroad, are asking the US and Israel to intervene in Iran and help them finally remove the regime, they are also chanting “Javid Shah” (“Long Live the Shah”) and demanding the return of the exiled Iranian opposition leader Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. He is the son of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, who was ousted by the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and fled the country with his family that same year.

This creates a complex situation in Europe. On one hand, Europe stands with the Iranian protesters; on the other hand, Europe neither can nor is willing to intervene militarily in Iran. Europe also could not easily support a US intervention, just as it did not support the US intervention in Venezuela, especially now that the relations between the US and Europe are strained.

At a joint press conference on 13 January, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the Iranian people do not want regime change imposed by external powers. “Each of us knows that quite well. That could always lead to further problems. So, whether it happens or not, the Iranian people clearly do not want regime change from the outside,”

“Right now, it’s not clear whether the regime is going to fall or not,” Kallas initially said in response to Pistorius’ comments. She stressed that historical precedents show that successful transitions require viable alternatives from within to maintain a functioning state.

“History is full of examples of regimes being overthrown, but the question is what comes after. You need alternatives from within to have a functioning state,” Kallas said.

“Nobody knows what the next days or weeks may bring. The way Assad fell in Syria took many by surprise, but other regimes of this type have proved very resilient. The courage of the Iranian people is humbling … but no one knows what the coming days will bring,” she also said.

Europe is further divided over Reza Pahlavi’s role because of his father’s legacy and his association with the monarchy, despite Pahlavi’s clear statement that he does not intend to restore the monarchy in Iran if he returns. He has emphasised that the Iranian people should decide their future via a referendum and has called on Europe to apply economic and political pressure on the Islamic regime.

“I am here to guarantee a transition to a secular democratic future,” Reza Pahlavi addressed the Iranians at a rally in Munich.

“I am committed to be the leader of transition for you, so we can one day have the final opportunity to decide the fate of our country through a democratic, transparent process to the ballot box.” he said.

Finnish MEP Sebastian Tynkkynen collected signatures from 35 MEPs for a petition calling for Reza Pahlavi to be invited to the European Parliament. However, on 16th January, he posted on X that he had been informed that Reza Pahlavi could not be invited to speak at the European Parliament because it would be seen as an expression of support for the monarchy, even though the King of Spain was invited to address a plenary session in Strasbourg one week later. Swedish MEP Charlie Weimers has also urged the EU to invite the exiled prince to address the European Parliament.

By contrast, Spanish MEP and lecturer in international terrorism Hana Jalloul Muro stated in a speech at the European Parliament: “And certainly it’s not the Shah but free elections,” implying that she does not support Pahlavi’s role as a potential transitional leader. She nonetheless expressed her support for the Iranian people and condemned the Iranian regime’s support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as the violence, arrests, and killings against the protesters.

Spain’s foreign minister, José Manuel Albares, said on 15th January that US intervention would not bring stability to Iran.

“Unilateral external action is not going to provide stability to Iran, which is what it needs at the moment,” Albares stated during a speech before a plenary session in the Spanish Congress.

On 22nd January, a resolution condemning Iran’s repression of protesters was overwhelmingly passed, with 562 votes in favour, 9 against, and 57 abstentions. However, an amendment calling for the opposition leader, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, to address the European Parliament failed to pass, receiving only 132 votes in favour, 382 against, and 96 abstentions. This outcome highlights how polarising Pahlavi is in Europe, despite his popularity among many Iranians both inside and outside the country.

In response, the European Left proposed amendments urging the EU to exert diplomatic pressure on the United States and Israel to refrain from issuing or supporting military threats against Iran, to lift sanctions, and to condemn any external attempts at destabilisation in violation of international law. These amendments, however, were rejected and did not pass.

On 12th January, Donald Trump posted on social media expressing his support for the Iranian protesters. He urged them to continue demonstrating, cancelled meetings with IRGC officials, and promised that “help is on its way,” only to call off a planned strike at the last minute a few days later. On 16th January, Trump told reporters that “Iran cancelled the hanging of over 800 people,” and therefore he would not strike Iran. Iran’s top prosecutor, Mohammad Movahedi, denied these claims, while recent reports indicate that the executions remain scheduled and that a large number of protesters have already been executed or sentenced to death by the Islamic regime.

However, the news that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group has arrived in the Middle East shows that US intervention in Iran is closer than ever and will likely target the Islamic regime and particularly Ali Khamenei—an outcome that many Iranians hope for but Europeans fear.

“I don’t want to talk about what I’ll do with Iran. They want a deal; they approached us several times. We have a big armada there, bigger than we had in Venezuela,” Trump said during his interview on Axios.

Maj. Gen. Ali Abdollahi, commander of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, stated that any aggression against the country “will immediately turn all American interests, bases, and centres of influence into legitimate, definite, and accessible targets” for Iran.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to negotiate with the Islamic Republic. The latest talks (at the time of writing) between the US and Iran, which took place in Geneva on 17 February 2026, lasted three and a half hours and ended with an agreement to continue negotiations, although the details remain vague. The talks mainly focused on Iran’s nuclear programme, but could potentially extend to ballistic missiles and regional proxies. Furthermore, he has expressed support for the idea of regime change in Iran.

“Seems like that would be the best thing that could happen,” Trump told reporters after visiting Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

“For 47 years, they’ve been talking and talking and talking, “In the meantime, we’ve lost a lot of lives while they talk. Legs blown off, arms blown off, faces blown off. We’ve been going on for a long time.” he added

When asked who he would like to see take over Iran, Trump replied, ‘I don’t want to talk about that. There are people.”

Trump has said that the US is prepared to deploy a ‘very large force’ if ongoing negotiations with Iran fail.

“Well, if we don’t reach an agreement, we’ll need it. If we do, we could cut it short. It’ll be leaving soon. It’ll be leaving very soon.’ We have one out there that has just arrived. It’s ready. It’s a big force — a very big force,” Trump told reporters when asked why he had decided to send a second aircraft carrier to the region.

On 18 February, the White House stated that diplomacy remains US President Donald Trump’s top option in negotiations with Iran, despite discussions about potential military strikes. Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt highlighted arguments for striking Iran, citing Trump’s June attacks that “totally obliterated” its nuclear program, but emphasised Trump’s preference for a deal. She declined to discuss talks with Israel or set deadlines for Iran.

“The President has always been very clear, though, with respect to Iran or any country around the world, diplomacy is always his first option, and Iran would be very wise to make a deal with President Trump and with this administration. He’s talking to many people, of course, his national security team first and foremost,” Leavitt told the press. “I don’t have any specifics on the president’s recent conversations with Israel.” she added.

No one can predict with certainty what Iran’s future will look like after the current protests and any potential regime change—whether it comes from within Iran or through outside intervention. Many geopolitical analysts have outlined a range of scenarios for Iran after Khamenei, both optimistic and pessimistic. One thing, however, is clear: Europe will not remain unscathed by the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

First and foremost, the transition from theocracy to democracy would not be easy. Repairing the damage caused by 47 years of international and economic isolation, as well as the impact of Sharia-based governance, will likely be a long and difficult process.

If the post-regime period results in a stable, secular democracy, as many Iranians hope, Iran is likely to be reintegrated into the global community and to see sanctions progressively lifted. Given its size, strategic location in the Middle East, population of over 90 million, and substantial historical, cultural, and natural resources, Iran would represent a significant but currently untapped market for European companies. Under such conditions, investment flows between Iran and Europe would be expected to increase markedly. While Iran is unlikely ever to join the EU—the European Union is not “like Eurovision,” open to countries outside Europe—Tehran could nonetheless develop close, structured cooperation with Brussels in areas such as trade, energy, and defence. In this context, an Iran–EU trade agreement, similar in overall design to those with India or Mercosur, would become a plausible option.

Travel between Iran and Europe would also likely become easier. Visa requirements could be relaxed or, in certain cases, removed, particularly if Iran undertakes meaningful liberalisation of its domestic laws. For European women, for instance, the abolition of compulsory hijab would lower a key barrier to travel and make the country more practically accessible for female tourists. Iran’s 29 UNESCO World Heritage Sites and other tourist attractions—including the ruins of Persepolis, the Golestan Palace, and the Nasir al-Mulk Mosque—would then be better positioned to attract a steady flow of visitors.

Moreover, Iran is one of the world’s largest producers of oil and gas and a major energy actor in the Middle East. Iranian gas could provide Europe with a significant alternative to Russian supplies and could be priced more competitively than gas imported from the United States. Increased oil exports to Europe would, in turn, strengthen Iran’s economy and create further incentives for deepening bilateral economic ties.

If, however, regime change leads instead to prolonged conflict or civil war, as many analysts fear, Europe would face serious challenges of another kind. A destabilised Iran could trigger a new migration crisis, with millions of displaced Iranians seeking asylum across European countries, putting additional strain on Europe’s political systems, social services, and internal cohesion.

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