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In the place where Gaza no longer resembles what it once was, a new geopolitical experiment is taking shape. This is not simply a peacekeeping mission, nor is it a classic humanitarian intervention; this place is to become a testing ground for a complex architecture of international control, where military forces, new institutions, and European states coexist in a transitional power mechanism, with Europe in a paradoxical position, present on the ground but hesitant about the institutional legitimacy of this new system.

The foundation of this mechanism is UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which approves a comprehensive plan to end the conflict and authorizes the creation of a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. This force has clear military dimensions within the framework of the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, the complete disarmament of non-state armed forces, and Hamas itself. At the same time, it provides for the protection of civilians and the training of new Palestinian security forces, while cooperating with Israel and Egypt to control the borders and maintain stability.

This turning point for Gaza marks the beginning of a new chapter in which it will not simply be under humanitarian supervision, but under an international security regime. In practice, the ISF wants to act as a transitional mechanism of sovereignty, bridging the withdrawal of the Israeli army but not Israeli sovereignty, and the creation of a new Palestinian administrative and police system; however, with dubious capabilities for self-determination in its sovereign, vital space.

Europe, although not leading this initiative, has already begun to integrate into this new system. Greece, for example, according to verified information from the Kathimerini newspaper, plans to send a battalion of 100 to 150 soldiers, with armored vehicles, engineers, and medical personnel, taking an active role in security, not just humanitarian support, as was the case in Afghanistan. However, the government spokesman refused to comment on operational issues, without denying the information reported by Kathimerini. At the same time, according to information from the Greek Pentagon, two Greek officers are already at the CMCC civil-military coordination center in Kiryat Gat, which operates under US command.

This transition is not merely military. It is institutional. The UN resolution also provides for the creation of a new international organization, the so-called Board of Peace, a transitional administrative body with international legal personality, which will oversee the governance and reconstruction of Gaza until the Palestinian Authority can resume control.

“Stabilisation” in Gaza is not being built on the familiar, slow, transparent (and often inadequate) UN ecosystem, but on a new political-administrative mechanism called the Board of Peace, which has international legal status, a transitional administration and strategic guidance for an international security force, with dubious results and a strict, centralized, non-transparent policy by the US as guarantor of Israel’s plans.

Therefore, we do not simply have “peacekeeping,” we have a model of international surveillance that has been institutionally imposed as a “solution” and then expects others to legitimize it by participating.

This new body also creates political uncertainty, with the European Union and several of its member states as observers, avoiding full institutional integration. The European Commission, through Commissioner Dubravka Šuica, will attend the Peace Council meeting, but has made it clear that it will not become a member of the new organization, expressing reservations that this body may replace the UN.

Greece maintains a similar stance, participating only as an observer, seeking to maintain a balance between cooperation with the United States and commitment to the international system of legitimacy of the UN. The Greek government has made it clear that any participation in a peacekeeping force must be based on a clear mandate from the Security Council, underlining its fear of the creation of a parallel international power mechanism.

This hesitancy is not accidental, as the powers granted to the Board of Peace are extensive, with the ability to create administrative and operational structures, coordinate funding, and oversee the transitional governance of Gaza, effectively acting as a temporary international administration. 

On the European side, the involvement is not purely militaristic, Italy has already stated that it is ready to train a new Palestinian police force, strengthening the internal security mechanism that will replace the existing power structures in Gaza.

This training is a critical element of the transition process, as the ISF also has a mandate to support and train the new Palestinian security forces. This creates a proposal for a hybrid security model, an international military force for stabilization, a new Palestinian police force for internal order, and an international administrative mechanism for governance.

The reality, of course, remains fragile. The recent visit of the president of the German Bundestag, Julia Klöckner, to Gaza took place under strict military escort by the Israeli army, while even the journalists accompanying her did not have access to the territory, even though greater access for international observers and humanitarian aid is required internationally as a “moral obligation” and not a political concession. It bears repeating that the international community is planning the reconstruction and stabilization of Gaza, but real sovereignty over the territory remains fragmented.

This raises a deeper question: is this a peacekeeping mission or a new form of international governance? This initiative appears to have a Janus-like nature, combining a peacekeeping mission and international governance, with a view to creating conditions that will ultimately allow for the return of Palestinian self-government and the path to statehood. On the other hand, the creation of an international mechanism with military, police, and administrative powers is more reminiscent of models of international trusteeship, such as those implemented in the Balkans in the 1990s.

For Europe, this participation is also a test of strategic autonomy, since the initiative and strategic direction remain largely under American influence. Europe thus finds itself in an intermediate position, neither fully autonomous nor merely an observer. Gaza is thus becoming a laboratory for the future of international security. A field where armies, international organizations, and transitional administrations coexist, trying to impose order in an environment where the very concept of sovereignty remains under negotiation.

The real thing is whether it will create a new model of international power, where stability is managed not by states, but by multi-level mechanisms of military and institutional surveillance.

Europe is entering Gaza, testing its hard power capabilities, but rather experimentally and tentatively, maintaining its reservations in a field where legitimacy, security, and political narrative are already mined. The UN Security Council has given legal cover to the new structure (Board of Peace/ISF), but its architecture, with Donald Trump playing a central role in the Board of Peace and with a demilitarization mandate that explicitly targets “non-state armed groups,” looks more like a transitional “administration under supervision.”

That is why European maneuvers are revealing: with the European Commission attending as an observer, not as a member, citing a truce and reconstruction, but maintaining institutional distance from an initiative that many see as a parallel international center of gravity.

Italy, for its part, talks about training the Palestinian police, a “mild” tool that nevertheless determines who will wield state violence tomorrow. At the same time, the debate about a “European army” is resurfacing, but even leading voices warn that a parallel structure alongside NATO could confuse chains of command and become dangerous.

The irony is that, while major institutions and organizations were talking about mass crimes and genocide, the international community never “grabbed” the tool that was created precisely for this purpose, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Amnesty International has stated that it concludes that the legal threshold for genocide in Gaza has been met, while the UN has expressed similar documentation. And yet, R2P, as a framework that is supposed to mobilize prevention/response/collective action when a state fails to protect populations from atrocity crimes, has remained, in practice, politically inert.

The reason is almost cynically predictable, R2P depends on political consensus, especially in the Security Council, where geopolitics (and the veto) usually trumps “responsibility.” No one wants to open the box of binding accountability when the cost is conflict with powerful allies, changing rules of engagement, or real pressure.

Since the devastation has already occurred, the international system is demonstrating remarkable determination, not to protect, but to secure, resulting in asymmetrical power in the region. Resolution 2803 “regularizes” the Board of Peace and provides expanded powers to the International Stabilization Force.

The issue is that, until now, even the ceasefire had not really locked down the field. According to recent reports, Israeli strikes continue as normal after the start of the ceasefire, in an environment where humanitarian needs remain enormous.

In conclusion, R2P was not “missing” because there was no crisis; it was missing because there was no political will. And now that the will is emerging, it is emerging mainly as a security mechanism, a Board of Peace that seems to be solving the problem of power first. 

 

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