Professor Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka, an expert at Team Europe Direct and a researcher at the Sorbonne University, talks about the reasons behind the deepening political instability along the Seine.
Szymon Rogaczewski: Professor, aside from the budget dispute, what are the main reasons for the fall of François Bayrou’s government?
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka: Let’s start with the fact that this government essentially brought about its own downfall. This was the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic that a Prime Minister requested a vote of confidence to gain political support for his policy — and didn’t receive it, which forced him to resign.
Usually, it’s the opposition that censures the government and files motions of no confidence. In this case, it was a pre-emptive move — Bayrou anticipated the fall of his cabinet, as did virtually everyone else. A miracle could have happened, but it didn’t. Why? Mainly because the government’s plan to fix public finances and the economic situation was not approved by either the left or the right. The budget, as we know, is a fundamental matter for France and any state, but the opposition argued that Prime Minister Bayrou failed to consult openly and conciliatorily enough, given the current political setup. He proposed the budget and fiscal cuts to save France’s finances in a rather one-sided manner. The opposition believed it hurt the poorest and the working class — which is what both the trade unions and the right-wing held against him. So, in a way, he was asking to be removed from office.
Another major factor was the very strong polarization of the political scene. After the snap elections called by President Macron following the dissolution of the French parliament in 2024, the National Assembly — the lower house — has been divided into three blocs: the left, the right, and the center. None can govern alone, and they cannot find common ground to create a cross-party agreement for France.
Let’s recall that President Emmanuel Macron sensed he had lost the trust of the nation after his camp’s defeat in the European Parliament elections in May 2024, so he dissolved the parliament and announced new elections. Macron said he wanted to give the people — the sovereign — the power to choose the kind of government they wanted. However, in practice, the president did not truly respect the democratic outcome of that vote.
The elections produced the three aforementioned blocs, but it’s worth noting that the single party that won the most seats was the National Rally — Marine Le Pen’s far-right party — which secured around 140 seats. In terms of electoral coalitions, the leftist New Popular Front won decisively, with nearly 200 seats. But the leftist coalition is highly eclectic: on one side there’s the radical left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise), with whom it’s nearly impossible to compromise, but there are also socialists, ecologists, and communists. The third bloc is the centrist coalition supporting President Macron (MoDem, Renaissance, Horizons), which gained around 160 seats.
If we were to think in purely democratic terms — to respect the voters’ will — then in 2024 the left should have been given the mandate to form a government. However, Macron handed the premiership to Michel Barnier, a center-right Republican who didn’t even place among the top three in the elections. After Barnier’s fall, the next PM was centrist-macronist Bayrou, who also included Republicans in his cabinet — for instance, Bruno Retailleau as Interior Minister. Since Bayrou was closely associated with Macron, the failure to grant him confidence undermines Macron’s position and could force him to resign — which is exactly what the far-right is calling for.
Before Macron announced that the new Prime Minister would be Sébastien Lecornu, I had thought it would have been better to appoint someone from the moderate left — someone like Olivier Faure, for example. But clearly, Macron has no intention of handing power to the left. So the new PM is once again a Macron loyalist: Sébastien Lecornu — who still hasn’t formed a government. You could say both ends of the political spectrum are waiting for their turn — for another centrist failure.
Szymon Rogaczewski: It’s been over two weeks without a new government being formed. You mentioned how hard it is to negotiate with the different political groups. What impact does this have on Sébastien Lecornu and the new cabinet, especially when it’s so hard to even establish one?
K. Borońska-Hryniewiecka: Sébastien Lecornu, the former Minister of Defense, who held a very prominent role until now, is a relatively young politician — not yet 40 — unlike the two previous prime ministers, who were older, more seasoned politicians. He’s from Macron’s camp, originally from the Renaissance party, but it’s worth remembering he was associated with the Republicans until 2017. He leans more center-right than center-left.
However, wanting to present a new style of governance, Lecornu promised broad consultations with the left — and he is indeed making those efforts. He understands that he must open up to cooperation with the Socialists or, more broadly, with the leftist bloc, because it’s the left that is currently the main destabilizing force in the system.
If you look at what’s happening in the streets of France — the strikes and demonstrations of recent days — this wave of protest is primarily driven by the left. The key actors are the trade unions — and there are many in France — various leftist associations, left-wing intellectuals, and universities, especially the Sorbonne.
Many from the middle class have also joined these strikes. The right isn’t driving this — it’s more watching from the sidelines. Lecornu, before presenting a cabinet proposal, is proceeding cautiously. First, there needs to be agreement on a concrete program, and only then can he present individuals willing to implement it. Ideally, it would be the broadest possible coalition that agrees on at least one point: not to censure the government — not to propose a vote of no confidence. So Lecornu is spending his time consulting — he’s already held many meetings in recent days. However, the recurring strikes and social mobilization show that it won’t be easy and that some of the left’s more radical demands will have to be met. These include reversing the pension reform and taxing the wealthy and large corporations.
Szymon Rogaczewski: Since President Macron has been ineffective in parliament and cannot manage the crisis (after all, Lecornu is the fifth prime minister), shouldn’t he resign, given that this is what both major parties and the public want?
K. Borońska-Hryniewiecka: That’s the question. Macron already stated during the 2024 elections that no matter what, he does not intend to step down. He has repeatedly used the word “responsibility.” I think he has a point — considering the current geopolitical instability in Europe, especially the war in Ukraine, shaky transatlantic relations, and shifting global dynamics, strong leadership is crucial. In this respect, Macron performs well, particularly regarding France’s role in supporting Kyiv and defining Europe’s role in the world.
Looking solely at the French domestic situation, there’s no guarantee that dissolving the parliament and holding new elections would lead to a stable majority. Recent polls show a highly divided public: 55% want a center-right government, 54% want a left-wing one. And 70% of French people don’t believe any government can be formed at all!
Polarization in France is complex. There’s no clear way to cut this Gordian knot. And it’s a paradox that France — one of the most generous welfare states in Europe, with an extensive redistribution system — has a society that feels overworked and underpaid. It’s true that the current welfare system is funded by debt. Different groups have different grievances — the youth complain about high unemployment, housing costs, and lack of prospects; the middle class feels it shoulders most of the tax burden without getting proportional benefits; business owners complain about excessive bureaucracy; and the intellectual left accuses Macron of being the president of the rich and refusing to tax them. Even top experts struggle to find a way out of this impasse — and I certainly wouldn’t want to be in Prime Minister Lecornu’s shoes right now.
Szymon Rogaczewski: Lately, the internal crisis in France has become quite tense, as we’ve discussed. But there are also growing concerns about the European Commission placing France on its priority list for addressing its budget deficit — does this undermine Paris’ international standing?
K. Borońska-Hryniewiecka: Government instability and the budget impasse definitely weaken Paris’ position, especially when France wants to push trade or industrial solutions that other international partners oppose. It gives critics an easy excuse: “You’re not credible — you can’t even fix your own chaos.” Rising labor costs and expensive investments also erode investor confidence. On the other hand, France’s international allies — mainly EU countries and the Commission — tend to be more understanding, having grown accustomed to France’s internal issues. Let’s not forget: France is the EU’s second-largest economy and second-largest net contributor to the EU budget.
The Commission is indeed concerned about France’s economic situation, but first — France is “too big to fail.” Second — the eurozone now has control and safety mechanisms (introduced after the 2008–2012 crisis) to prevent a repeat of the Greek scenario.
In my view, the bigger issue is that the French public expects the burden of debt financing to shift to businesses, corporations, and the wealthy. Meanwhile, the government sees investment in defense and continued aid to Ukraine as crucial.
This, of course, provokes resistance from both the far-right and far-left — both of which are also anti-war in orientation.
Szymon Rogaczewski: Elections will eventually take place in France. Who, in your opinion, is the favorite to win?
K. Borońska-Hryniewiecka: If elections were held in the coming weeks or months, the favorite would be a right-wing candidate – either Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella, if Le Pen is barred from running due to a finalized conviction for misappropriating European Parliament funds.
It’s worth noting that over the past few years, the French far right has undergone a certain normalization. Polls show that Le Pen and the National Rally are increasingly seen by the French public as credible — both in terms of understanding the country’s problems and being capable of governing effectively, although the latter remains hypothetical, since they haven’t yet been in power.
At the same time, the far right has been working hard to “de-demonize” its image — moving away from its most radical slogans (e.g., antisemitic or anti-Muslim rhetoric) and instead emphasizing issues that resonate more with the average voter: inflation, security, migration.
This normalization is also visible in Le Pen’s distancing from Russia and Vladimir Putin, which used to be a weak point in her foreign policy credibility. Today, she is trying to present herself — and her party — as defenders of national interest, pragmatic rather than ideological, ready to govern.
Across French society, one hears more and more often:
“Maybe it’s time to give them a chance?”
And that’s the question many are seriously considering.
If I had to bet today, I would say that the right will win the next elections.