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After more than a decade, the European Union (the European Commission) seems to believe once again in its enlargement. In November 2025, the enlargement package was presented, marking a shift from rhetoric to a commitment with real depth. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos described it as a “political priority and geopolitical investment,” while High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas spoke of a “realistic possibility in the coming years.” It is presented as ambitious but with many different paths, from the target of completing negotiations with Montenegro by the end of 2026, with Albania by 2027, and Moldova together with Ukraine by 2028, timetables that the Commission has officially accepted.

The sense of urgency caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine has reshaped the Union’s priorities, turning enlargement into a strategic tool for resilience and influence. “Enlargement is in our interest,” Callas said in Brussels, stressing that the accession of new countries by 2030 is now a “realistic goal.” It should be noted that, although ambitious and strategically beneficial, the project remains institutionally uncertain and politically fragile. The Union is called upon to prepare itself, adapt its institutions, allocate resources, and convince European societies once again that enlargement is not a risk but a renewal.

In the race for integration and enlargement are the so-called “four reliable countries,” Albania, Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries that have turned their ambition into tangible results, now accompanied by clear timetables, with the potential and political will for dynamic reforms. Montenegro has already closed four negotiating chapters and is expected to complete others within the year, with the Commission considering the 2026 accession target to be realistic. However, there is a constant emphasis on the need to improve the rule of law, the administration of justice, and transparency in the prosecution of corruption. Albania is making significant progress, with five of the six negotiation clusters already opened, while the government is showing political will and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The annual report acknowledges the commitment to reform measures, but points to corruption and pressure on judicial independence as chronic weaknesses. Along the same lines, in just one year, the Commission confirmed that Moldova meets the criteria to open three negotiation clusters, despite the hybrid attacks and attempts at Russian interference it faces. Its alignment with European foreign policy stands at 88%, demonstrating a clear strategic orientation.

Finally, Ukraine is the political core of this enlargement. Although it is still at war, it is moving forward with legislation reforms in areas such as the fight against corruption and the independence of the judiciary. The Commission, while acknowledging the progress made, points to the need for a stable framework for oversight and protection of institutions from political pressure. The broader delays are due more to a lack of unanimity within the EU, as Hungary continues to block progress in the negotiations, which directly affects Moldova. The progress and shift away from rhetoric and hardline policymaking shows that the door remains open for those who consistently implement reforms and respond to attempts by Russia to exert influence in the region.

The flipside of the coin is the countries that are failing to make progress despite their open declaration of participation. Serbia has shown a consistent lack of progress in the areas of the rule of law and media freedom, with anti-European narratives often emanating from the political leadership itself, intensifying public alienation, while mass protests in the country fuel the impression that Belgrade is now in an institutional deadlock. North Macedonia, although fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign policy, remains hostage to constitutional deadlock with delays in constitutional amendments to recognize all ethnic communities, including Bulgarians, has “frozen” reforms and reinforced the climate of disappointment within the country.

The great patient is, of course, Georgia, which is the most worrying example of democratic regression—despite popular support for the European perspective, the Tbilisi government has turned to Moscow, restricting the opposition and imposing laws that resemble Russian models (see foreign agent law). The European Commission now describes the country as a “candidate in name only,” with its European future in serious doubt. The EU Ambassador to Tbilisi, Pawel Herczynski, spoke of “disappointing findings” that distance the country from any realistic prospect of accession by 2030.

At the operational level, unanimity remains the biggest institutional headache, as each stage of negotiations requires the approval of all 27 member states. Hungary has already vetoed Ukraine, which also affects Moldova, as the two files are politically linked. Internally, France and Germany warn that without institutional reforms and a new fiscal framework, a major enlargement could destabilize the cohesion of the Union. Secondly, the European Commission, recognizing the risk of “enlargement without Union,” has begun to discuss mechanisms to avoid vetoes at technical stages, as well as stronger safeguards for future member states, with the Commission considering the possibility of limiting the veto rights of new members in sensitive areas, such as foreign policy, for the first few years after their accession.

The renewed prospect of enlargement is an exercise; an exercise before the political need reaches a level where it can be implemented. For the first time in years, the EU is talking about enlargement as a tool for security and stability. “A united continent is the strongest response to those who seek to divide Europe,” said Kaja Kallas when presenting the 2025 package. 2030 is being touted as a milestone for new accession, but institutional readiness and political cohesion remain elusive. At the same time, countries such as Italy are attempting to act as mediators between Brussels and the Balkans, insisting that the EU must align expectations and realism if it wants to maintain its credibility and avoid surprises amid disagreement, national promises, and the European need for integration.

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