The AfD wants to change its suit

The German far right, under the political vehicle of the AfD, seems to be trying to change its image after coming second in the federal elections of February 2025. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) found itself in the dystopian position of being all-powerful, yet excluded from power due to the post-war Brandmauer, the informal barrier to cooperation between the other parties and the far right. The AfD, of course, did not respond with an ideological re-examination, but kept its core “pure” (sic) and proceeded with a strategy of beautification. According to the New York Times, the party has adopted a new code of conduct for its MPs, with fines and penalties for “extreme rhetoric” not to renounce its positions, but to hide them from public view, now that everyone knows its positions anyway, their toxicity behind a parliamentary politeness.

Beatrix von Storch (senior AfD politician and Deputy Leader of its parliamentary group in the Bundestag) , the mastermind and architect of this new tactic, presented a political counterattack plan reminiscent of Trump’s policy of refining authoritarian ideals through not only a softening of the AfD, but also through the simultaneous engineered polarization of the system. Of course, such a plan, which seeks to deliver an enemy, none other than the radical left in the form of Die Linke, in an attempt not only to sway public opinion in this tug-of-war but also to draw the Christian Democrats’ conservatives under Merz to the table for discussions on possible collaborations and the formation of a front. After all, the AfD makes no secret of its inspiration, its official visits to MAGA (a hardline nationalist and nativist political force in the U.S., born from Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and fueled by the “Make America Great Again” slogan) events, its rhetorical memes about “radical left lunatics” and “woke ideologies,” which are part of its everyday language.

As revealed by a leak of a strategic document presented by Politico earlier in July, the goal is to shift the bipolarity, no longer between the AfD and the rest of the political world, but between a “bourgeois-conservative” space and a “radicalized left”—in an attempt to break the Brandmauer (Germany’s informal postwar cordon sanitaire blocking cooperation with the far right). The AfD does not want to stand out as extreme, but as the “logical” alternative to the “ideological outburst of the woke.” And to achieve this, it needs a caricatured opponent.

The ultimate goal is to intensify cultural conflict in terms of gender, identity, and ideology, with the left appearing radical but disconnected from the people and attached to minority agendas, the AfD aspires to become the privileged partner of the Christian Democrats.

“Culture” as a strategic tool for managing political power

The invention of an artificial cultural civil war is strikingly reminiscent of Trump’s strategy, with its permanent investment in “anger,” systematic distortion of the concept of social progress, and deliberate cancellation of dialectical thinking as common features. In place of social conflict between class or productive interests, there is conflict over identity, values, and lifestyle. In the end, the goal is obvious and one need only point a finger at it. Behind this “lofty” rhetoric, which denounces “cultural Marxism,” lies the most cynical and dangerous policy for a pivot with an uncertain possibility of return, the overthrow of the post-war consensus that kept the far right on the margins.

The genius and effectiveness of this strategy lies in the fact that it does not operate in a vacuum but is grounded in a profound crisis of meaning, which Eric Hobsbawm (British Marxist historian known for his work on nationalism, capitalism, and the 20th century) had already described in the 1990s. In his text The Crisis of Today’s Ideologies, the historian does not simply record the decline of the grand narratives of the 20th century; he describes an existential difficulty societies have in understanding themselves amid the storm of technological, demographic, and cultural change.

Milestones of this process were rapid urbanization, education as a mass phenomenon, the changing position of women, and the redefinition of established social roles in the wake of seismic ideological changes. People were moving away from traditional identities but were unable to find fulfillment in the new ones. In this landscape, political imagination is waning and public debate is devolving into either technocratic management or emotionally charged identity dilemmas.

The AfD is exploiting this crisis with surgical precision in an attempt to portray the left as a “woke threat” rather than a political choice, too radical to coexist with the “rational average citizen.” That way, the AfD pretends to bridge the gap between popular sentiment and the political class, when in reality it’s deliberately widening it to make itself look like the only coherent narrative.

Who will be the one to respond?

Conservatism against “cultural excess,” the petite bourgeoisie against a “woke elite,” is not merely a communicative ploy but a strategy of deep depoliticization. It shifts the discussion from material interests and social conflicts to a moral panic around identities and “values.”

The Left cannot survive if it loses touch with contemporary culture, meaning the symbols, languages, media, and everyday habits through which people understand the world. And by “contemporary culture” we mean not only digitally produced content but also the way the platform economy works, how we live in cities that are being commodified and marginalize their residents, new cultural identities, gender roles, and the constant anxiety, especially for future generations, about climate decay, mental health, and all those cultural derivatives that provide a common vocabulary. Culture is something democratic, “built from the bottom up”; popular forms of expression, symbols, and the rhythms of everyday life organize ways of feeling, identities, and collective action.

If the Left continues to rely on outdated narratives, even regarding its historical subject matter, as if we were still in the 1970s, then it is speaking to an audience that no longer exists—and ceding the field to those who exploit identity and fear, labeling every social advance as a crisis and stirring up feelings of moral panic. This does not mean, of course, that traditional, core demands have been fulfilled and are now obsolete, but that they need to be revisited in terms of how they are communicated. So,  if it remains trapped in old narratives about the new way of life and people’s new experiences, then it will either turn into technocratic management or degenerate into a defensive mirror image of far-right rhetoric. The AfD’s campaigns are based precisely on this void. On a Left that struggles to inspire and convince people that the world can be different, instead of imagining the end of history.

Thomas Zimmermann writes in Jacobin that Die Linke must refuse to play into the game of cultural polarization, resist the temptation of symbolic radicalism, and return to class politics with popular characteristics—without renouncing rights, but without fetishizing them in isolation from the needs of the social body. However, this is easier to formulate in theory than to implement in an environment where the media, social media, and populist rhetoric favor emotion over analysis, which is difficult to convey to popular audiences that may be experiencing emotional and information fatigue.

It is true that in recent years, the Left and progressive political forces have shown greater interest in issues of lifestyle and individual rights—which is certainly not a bad thing,  as the so called “liberation” is not limited to the economic sphere. However, class issues have indeed receded from the public agenda. The approach that strictly separates one from the other often leads to the adoption of elements of the far-right or alt-right logic of exclusion.

Both socialist and more radical left-wing politics need to rediscover the core of their historical subject. In these contradictory circumstances, phenomena such as that of Sahra Wagenknecht emerge, for whom there is confusion as to her political identity and the culture she represents. Although she promotes economic protectionism and seeks to restore the post-war welfare state policy, she simultaneously adopts a strongly conservative discourse on identity issues, adopting exclusionary policies. As such, she can hardly be considered a representative of progressivism—after all, protectionist policies have also been implemented by far-right powers and formations.

The AfD and the broader culture of the far right will not be defeated because it is “wrong” or “extreme.” It will only be defeated if there is an alternative proposal that gives hope, speaks clearly, and rebuilds communities of meaning. The cultural war waged by the far right is not incidental; it is its primary weapon. At the end of the day, history is written by those who understand the present but have the courage to speak about the future. Perhaps it is time for some people to remember this.

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