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In September 2024, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama declared at the UN General Assembly that his country would create a “Vatican of Islam” in the heart of Tirana, a small state that would belong exclusively to the Bektashi community, a Shiite-Sufi brotherhood with a long history in the Balkans. Although his statement came as a surprise both at home and abroad, it is not as if there had been no rumors about this move. The plan calls for the establishment of the “Sovereign State of the Bektashi Order” on an area of just ten hectares, about a quarter of the size of the Vatican, a state that will have its own administration, passports, and borders.

The Albanian Prime Minister is known for his communication tricks, and the fact that he chose to break the news first to the New York Times and then repeat it in New York, ensuring international coverage, can be considered as such. The move was part of his narrative about Albania as a model of religious tolerance in the Balkans, a region where religious identities often spark conflict.

Even after a year, the plan remains at the announcement stage, with the spiritual leader of the Bektashi, Baba Mondi, pledging that all decisions will be made with “love and kindness”. Despite its dominant administration, as Rama pointed out, this new state entity will not have its own law enforcement and security forces, nor will it have a special tax regime, but will instead be a “spiritual state” based at the Bektashi World Center in Tirana, fully integrated into the Albanian Constitution.

But who are they?

The Bektashi are one of the most distinctive branches of Islamic mysticism and a certainly unique and underrepresented community in the Balkans. The Bektashi brotherhood was founded in the 13th century in Anatolia by Haji Bektash Veli and soon became closely associated with the Ottoman Janissary corps, serving as their spiritual guide. After the dissolution of the Janissary corps in 1826, the community suffered violent persecution by Sultan Mahmud II and found themselves under persecution. A difficult moment for the brotherhood was their forced relocation in 1925, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk banned all Sufi orders in Turkey, resulting in the Bektashi moving their headquarters to Tirana in 1929.

Albania was not only a place for religious roots but also a place for national power to grow, since the Bektashi were connected to the Albanian Renaissance movement (Rilindja) in the 19th century, promoting a more liberal version of Islam that could bridge Muslims and Christians around the demand for national independence. This dynamic explains why, despite their numerical inferiority, they had strong political influence.

Today, the Bektashi present an image of moderation and tolerance. Within the community, alcohol consumption is permitted, there are no dress codes, and their doctrine combines Shiism with elements of mysticism and dervish worship. They claim to make up as much as 30% of the Albanian population, although the official census recorded them at around 5–10%, while worldwide it is estimated that there are 7 to 20 million Bektashi, with strong communities in Turkey and smaller ones in Greece — mainly in Thrace — and the US.

The Bektashi, as mentioned,  diachronically carry a reputation for tolerance, inclusivity, and anti-clericalism — traits that gave it an unusual proximity to socialist ideals of equality and fraternity. In the early years of Enver Hoxha’s regime, some Bektashi leaders even aligned with the new state, presenting their movement as a “modern” and progressive face of Islam, distinct from Sunni orthodoxy. But the rapprochement was short-lived. By 1967, when Hoxha declared Albania the world’s first atheist state, the Bektashis,  like all religious groups,  were silenced, their tekkes shut down and their clergy persecuted. The hard irony remains: this community that once was celebrated for its compatibility with socialist narratives of brotherhood and emancipation was ultimately crushed by the very materialist ideology it had sought to accommodate.

It is this tradition of heterodox tolerance that allows Rama to present it as a “treasure” for the country’s image, but also in line with the ideological positions and connections that he wants to appear to be promoting. Although a minority, the Bektashi are for him the most convenient example of an Islam without fanaticism, capable of being promoted internationally as an Albanian brand.

 

Rama’s vision and internal reactions

Edi Rama presented the establishment of the “Sovereign State of Bektashi” not as an act of division within Albanian society but as a spiritual and symbolic initiative. In his speech at the UN, he recalled that Albania saved Jews during World War II and recently hosted Afghan refugees after the Taliban returned to power. At the same time, he invoked the example of Mother Teresa, the most famous Albanian Catholic, in order to frame the project within a narrative of “Albanian humanitarianism” with Rama’s rhetoric focusing on giving a positive international image of Islam “not to be defined by stigma, but to show what moderate Islam really means.”

With this plan, Rama is trying to promote Albania as a modern, liberal, and tolerant state in the Balkans, at a time when the country’s image is being tarnished by allegations of corruption and organized crime. Domestic reactions were immediate, with opposition leader Sali Berisha describing the plan as a “sultanate in the center of the country”, arguing that it would turn into a tax and criminal haven for corruption and crime. At the same time, prominent legal experts warned that such an initiative violates the Constitution and undermines state cohesion. In the international context, reactions have come from both Turkey and Iran, with the latter expressing its acceptance of Rama’s attack from the UN podium. Albania severed diplomatic relations with Iran after the cyberattacks of 2022, but it also serves as a platform for the Iranian opposition organization MEK. Following Rama’s announcement, the Turkish ambassador to Tirana publicly called on Baba Mondi to distance himself from Israel because of his contacts with the former, while Iranian media spoke of “the exploitation of Bektashism” by foreign powers. At the same time, international acceptance of the plan remains uncertain, as Rama himself admitted that he has not discussed the issue with NATO allies.

Internally, Baba Mondi initially claimed ignorance of the prime minister’s plans, which reinforced suspicions that it was a publicity stunt, but he later embraced the initiative, calling it a “miracle” and expressing hope that the United States and Western powers would recognize the new state. Beyond the harsh political game, Sunni Muslim organizations expressed concern about the creation of a separate religious state within Albania, stressing that the plan divides the country’s Islamic community as well as parts of the Bektashi diaspora itself, such as Baba Eliton Pashaj in Detroit, and opposed the initiative, accusing Baba Mondi of violating the constitution and politically exploiting religion.

At the same time, Albanian social media and the media treated the proposal with skepticism and satire, with many citizens interpreting it as yet another spectacular announcement by Rama to distract attention from the agenda of corruption and the government crisis.

Why all this?

Edi Rama’s plan for a “Vatican of Islam” in Tirana remains vague in its details, but it has already achieved its primary goal: to draw international attention. In practice, it is not certain that it will ever acquire the status described by the government; its progress will depend on the attitude of the Albanian Parliament on the one hand, and on the reactions of society and, of course, the recognition of the international community, on the other.

Why is Rama so concerned with the Bektashi? This is where soft power and cultural diplomacy come into play. The Bektashi may constitute only 10% of Albanian Muslims, but approximately 12 million live in Turkey and several thousand in the US diaspora. In this context, the Bektashi “mini-state” is yet another piece in the prime minister’s strategy to upgrade Albania’s international brand through the profile of tolerance, peace, and progressivism of the brotherhood. However, the institutionalization of Bektashism in the form of a “mini-state” poses risks, meaning that while their heterodoxy may have historically fostered tolerance, their subordination to state-party plans may transform an unconventional tradition into an instrument of political legitimization. Relevant developments regarding the acceptance or rejection of the plan will determine whether Bektashism will continue to be a force for cultural bridging or whether it will become part of the clientelistic power game in the Balkans.

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